Institutional Neutrality: Problems, Commitments, Concerns
Ezgi Sertler
15 January 2026
‘Institutional neutrality’ is mentioned quite frequently these days. It echoes in the corridors of our universities, is evoked in climate change discussions, and plays a big role in legal and journalistic discourses and disputes. The difficulty of dealing with ‘institutional neutrality’ not only stems from defining what is meant by it – as well as what is kept purposefully ambiguous about it – but also from the impossible task of sketching, in a context-sensitive way, what ‘being neutral’ might look like and what it implies in practice. Situated in the higher education context, this talk aims to unpack the term ‘neutrality’ in terms of the problems it brings with it, the commitments it is bound by, and the concerns it articulates for institutional environments. The talk consists of three sections. The first section attempts to outline a brief definition of neutrality by drawing on discussions of neutrality and impartiality in philosophy of science and political philosophy. It compares these definitions to the one outlined in the Kalven Report, a 1967 University of Chicago faculty committee report, which has been quite influential in current discussions of institutional neutrality in the US. The second section examines what the term neutrality is committed to epistemically and politically. Finally, the talk concludes with a discussion of concerns the term neutrality articulates. In other words, I ask, what institutional neutrality is a safeguard against and whether we need this term for those specific purposes. I also briefly question what is at stake if claims to neutrality and accusations of failing to be neutral are not managed well.
